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Claims by proponents of virtue ethics that virtue “ethics is a rival to
deontological and utilitarian approaches, as interestingly and challeng-
ingly different from either as they are from each other,”1 have met with
some skepticism. Kantians (and others) have wondered whether virtue
ethics and Kantian ethics are as deeply opposed as some virtue ethicists
claim, and if not, whether it might be possible to have a Kantian virtue
ethics.2 Such reflections were helpful in advancing the debate at a time
when virtue ethicists did not provide a very clear picture of just what
virtue ethics was, and often presented it primarily in terms of its
opposition to Kantian ethics3 and sometimes also to utilitarianism (or,
more broadly, consequentialism). The challenges spurred virtue ethicists
on to clarify and refine their conception of virtue ethics. In addition, the
bar was raised for discussions of Kantian ethics, for as Kantians (myself
among them) pointed out various ways in which Kantian ethics seemed
to be compatible with virtue ethics4 (seemed, because we couldn’t tell
1 Rosalind Hursthouse, 1999, On Virtue Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
p. 2.
2 The same issue can be raised concerning utilitarianism, but my focus here will be
on Kantian ethics.
3 They sometimes spoke instead of “deontological ethics” or “deontology”,
apparently intending this to be equivalent to or to include Kantian ethics. I think
“deontology” a rather unhelpful, because potentially misleading, term, so I’ll stick
to the term “Kantian ethics.”
4 I did so primarily in my contribution to Three Methods of Ethics (Marcia Baron/
Philip Pettit/Michael Slote (eds.), 1997, Three Methods of Ethics: A Debate,
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers) and in a comment I presented on Rosalind
Hursthouse’s invited paper, “Applying Virtue Ethics,” at the 1989 Pacific division
meeting of the American Philosophical Association. I also explored the issue of
just how virtue ethics and Kantian ethics differ in some earlier work (Marcia
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exactly what virtue ethics was supposed to be), we corrected some
misconceptions about Kantian ethics implicit in the characterizations of
virtue ethics.
For some time the problem of ascertaining just what virtue ethics is
supposed to be persisted, complicated by the diversity of views. To the
extent that it was possible to discern what each proponent of virtue ethics
took virtue ethics to be, the proponents seemed to have rather different
ideas, though they were united in holding that virtue ethics was opposed
to Kantian ethics, and was a viable alternative to the usual options.5 An
added complication was that others voiced similar criticisms of Kantian
ethics and utilitarianism (or contemporary moral theory, or “Enlighten-
ment morality”) without using the label “virtue ethics.” Should they too
be considered virtue ethicists?
The possibility that virtue ethics and Kantian ethics are compatible
was well worth exploring as long as contemporary virtue ethics remained
very hard to pin down. An appropriate response was to lay out the various
conceptions of virtue ethics and consider, on each conception, just what
the possible variations are. We could then ask, with respect to each
conception, whether a Kantian version is possible. If so, we could then
conclude that Kantian ethics and virtue ethics were compatible after all,
on at least one understanding of virtue ethics.
I believe that there is less value now in exploring that possibility.
Thanks especially to the work of Christine Swanton, there is now
considerably more clarity about virtue ethics, and therefore far less reason
Baron, 1985a, “The Ethics of Duty / Ethics of Virtue Debate and Its Relevance
to Educational Theory”, in: Educational Theory, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 135–149),
and laid out some ways of thinking about virtue ethics in Marcia Baron, 1985b,
“Varieties of Ethics of Virtue”, in: American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 22,
no. 1, pp. 47–53.
5 Some who place an emphasis on virtue and character (myself included) see such
an emphasis as compatible with utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, or both. Partly
because of this divide between those who think they are compatible and those
who think they are not, it has more recently become common to understand
“virtue ethics” more narrowly, so that it does not encompass just any approach
that takes virtue and character very seriously, or even every approach that puts its
emphasis on virtue or character (or virtue and character). Julia Driver, for
instance, clarifies that her project is not (a form of) virtue ethics : “Virtue ethics is
the project of basing ethics on virtue evaluation. I reject this approach. This is an
essay in virtue theory, since what I am trying to do is give an account of what
virtues are” (Julia Driver, 1996, “The Virtues and Human Nature”, in: Roger
Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 111–
129, note 1).
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for Kantians to try to figure out just what virtue ethics is (and what it
might be). Of course that might seem only to make the exploration of a
possible Kantian virtue ethics easier, not to render it unnecessary or less
worthwhile. But as I’ll explain shortly, virtue ethics (as articulated by
Swanton) and Kant’s ethics seem pretty clearly incompatible; and this is
no surprise, since the characterization of virtue ethics was crafted to rule
out Kant’s ethics.
Swanton distinguishes between virtue ethics as a genus and specific
conceptions of virtue ethics, each of which is a species of the genus. There
is thus an array of species of the genus virtue ethics, among them Neo-
Aristotelianism and Swanton’s pluralistic virtue ethics. With this in mind,
we can make sense of there being a variety of types of virtue ethics and
have no reason to ask which of the various proponents speaks for virtue
ethics – provided, that is, that we can see them as linked together by
being species of the same genus. What is the genus, of which Neo-
Aristotelianism and Swanton’s pluralistic virtue ethics are species?
Swanton puts forward the following as a way of characterizing virtue
ethics as a genus: “In virtue ethics, the notion of virtue is central in the
sense that conceptions of rightness, conceptions of the good life,
conceptions of ‘the moral point of view’ and the appropriate demand-
ingness of morality, cannot be understood without a conception of
relevant virtues.”6
Swanton’s approach is very helpful in that it permits the variation
among virtue ethicists that has been evident in the contemporary virtue
ethics literature, while at the same time providing an understanding of
virtue ethics that unites them. It also leaves room for the development of
new species of virtue ethics, or for arguing that a theory not generally seen
to be compatible with virtue ethics (the genus) in fact is compatible with
it (and perhaps even lends itself nicely to being developed as a version of
virtue ethics, i.e. , as another species of virtue ethics). Without taking
Swanton’s characterization of the genus to have canonical status, I think
her approach (including the distinction between the genus and the
6 Christine Swanton, 2003, Virtue Ethics : A Pluralistic View, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, p. 5. Swanton presents this characterization cautiously, prefacing
it as follows: “‘Virtue ethics’ resists precise definition, and rightly so. For as I
mentioned, it is frequently observed that virtue ethics in its modern development
is still in its infancy. It should not therefore be shackled by preconceived ideas
about its progeniture and nature.”
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species) the best way, at present, to understand virtue ethics, and in this
paper I understand virtue ethics accordingly.
Another respect in which her characterization is helpful is that while
fairly generously ecumenical, it is not a catch-all. It does not include
under the heading of “virtue ethics” each and every approach that
emphasizes character and virtue. That one offers an account of the
virtues, or finds it fruitful to capture a lot of what in twentieth century
ethics has been (purportedly) captured by talk of particular actions (or
states of affairs) by focusing instead on character and qualities of
character, is not enough to make one a virtue ethicist. I follow Swanton in
using the term “virtue ethics” in a way that marks virtue ethicists off from
those who place a considerable emphasis on virtue or offer an account (or
theory) of virtue or the virtues, but are not committed to viewing virtue
ethics as a distinct kind of normative theory (or, if one prefers not to use
the term ‘theory’ here, approach). I do not take “virtue ethicist” to
encompass everyone who thinks that virtue and character are neglected in
many discussions of ethics and need to be given a more prominent place
in ethics and ethical theory. Virtue ethicists put forward virtue ethics
(whether as a theory or in an anti-theoretic way) as a rival to
utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, and have sought to characterize it in
a way that sealed that conclusion.
Keeping in mind the genus as Swanton characterizes it, I think it is
safe to say that it would be an unwarranted stretch to view Kant’s ethics as
a species of virtue ethics. Not that it would be impossible to force it into
that mold; we might argue that while Kant’s conception of rightness can
be understood without a conception of such virtues as gratitude [MM 6:
455–456]7 and modesty (“willing restriction of one’s self-love in view of
the self-love of others” [MM 6: 462]), it cannot be understood without a
conception of the virtue of conscientiousness, or the virtue of being
committed to perfect oneself. Or we might classify the good will as a
virtue, and thereby ensure the conclusion that a conception of rightness
cannot be understood, on Kant’s ethics, without a conception of the
relevant virtues (or at least a relevant virtue). The problem with such
claims is not that they are false, but that they are forced. Kant does not
present the good will as a virtue, and although it is less of a stretch to
speak of the virtue of conscientiousness or the virtue of being committed
7 Page numbers refer to the Academy edition. The translations of Kant’s used in
this essay are those of Mary J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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to perfect oneself, he does not present them in quite that way. Nor, more
importantly, is it clear that a conception of rightness is impossible
without a conception of conscientiousness or being committed to perfect
oneself.
In thinking about whether it is valuable to try to merge Kantian
ethics and virtue ethics, we should keep in mind that the category “virtue
ethics” is one that has been developed quite recently, and for purposes
that reflect current issues in contemporary ethics rather than for purposes
that Kant had, or that relate helpfully to Kant’s aims. Moreover, as noted,
the focus has been on developing a conception of virtue ethics that allows
it to be an alternative to – and incompatible with – both utilitarianism
and Kantian ethics. This is particularly evident in the work of Michael
Slote and Rosalind Hursthouse, and also informs Swanton’s Virtue
Ethics.8
But could we fight this trend – this trend of understanding virtue
ethics as an alternative to, and at odds with Kantian ethics (and
utilitarianism)? It might be possible. We could develop an account of
various Kantian virtues (not necessarily enumerated by Kant), formulat-
ing them in such a way as to ensure that they meet Swanton’s criterion.
What I doubt is that this would be worthwhile, rather than simply
combative. It would make sense only if we think that virtue ethics, as
characterized by Swanton, would provide a shape for Kantian ethics that
enhances it, and I see no reason to think that it would. In addition, I see
no reason to resist the direction that Slote, Hursthouse and Swanton
(among others) favor. If they think it valuable to develop various species
of virtue ethics that take as their starting point that virtue ethics is a rival
to Kantian ethics, I see no need to challenge them and to claim that in
fact it is not really a rival to Kantian ethics, or that it need not be.9
8 See Hursthouse, 1999; Michael Slote, 1992, From Morality to Virtue, Oxford:
Oxford University Press; Michael Slote, 1997, “Virtue Ethics”, in: Baron/Pettit/
Slote, 1997; Michael Slote, 2001, Morals from Motives, Oxford: Oxford
University Press; and Swanton, 2003.
9 At a time when the claims to distinctness rested on rather vague assertions, and
on a seemingly distorted picture of Kantian ethics, it was important to so
challenge it, partly to bring out neglected aspects – and the untapped, or under-
tapped, potential of Kant’s ethics. The debate has advanced, thanks in part to
rejoinders by Kantians who point out that Kant’s ethics does not involve a “big
rule” from which all else is deduced; that it is not about rules and actions to the
exclusion of virtue and character; that it is not merely about what to do, not
about how to be, etc. For one of many works so depicting Kant’s ethics, see Julius
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More worthwhile, I think, is to examine the roots of the
dissatisfaction that has given rise to contemporary virtue ethics. At
least, that is what I find more worthwhile: to address the objections put
forward by virtue ethicists (or those loosely in their camp) against
Kantian ethics, objections that have not gone away. Contemporary virtue
ethics was nourished, perhaps even founded on, dissatisfaction with
Kantian ethics. Current conceptions of what virtue ethics is do not reflect
that dissatisfaction so much as they reflect a wish to offer virtue ethics as a
rival to both Kantian ethics and utilitarianism10; nonetheless, for some of
the leading virtue ethics proponents – in particular, Hursthouse and Slote
– the supposed inadequacy of those theories remains a primary reason for
developing virtue ethics.
In the remainder of this essay I turn my attention to assessing one
very prominent objection to Kantian ethics, the objection that it, along
with utilitarianism, places too much value on impartiality. I think it is
safe to say that this objection is a major source of the dissatisfaction that
gave rise to interest in virtue ethics and is widely held to be a problem
besetting Kantian ethics; however, I address it not only for that reason,
but also because I find it philosophically intriguing (and because I have
already discussed at length elsewhere another objection to Kantian ethics,
also philosophically fascinating, that provided some of the momentum
for contemporary virtue ethics, the objection that it overemphasizes
duty).11 I’ll give particular attention to a distillation of that criticism that
is frequently appealed (or at least gestured) to, yet has not been
articulated very fully: the “one thought too many” objection.
Moravcsik, 1981, “On What We Aim at and How We Live”, in: David Depew
(ed.), The Greeks and the Good Life, Indianapolis: Hackett University Press,
pp. 198–235. For corrections of this picture, see (among others) Marcia Baron,
1995, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology, Ithaca: Cornell University Press;
Barbara Herman, 1993, The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press; Onora O’Neill, 1989, Constructions of Reason, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; and Allen Wood, 1999, Kant’s Ethical Thought,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10 Indeed Swanton’s particular version of virtue ethics not only is not hostile to
Kant’s ethics but draws from Kant, as well as from a number of other thinkers. It
opposes Kant’s ethics primarily in being emphatically pluralistic.
11 In Baron, 1995, and more recently in Marcia Baron, 2002a, “Acting from Duty”,
in: Allen Wood (ed. and trans.), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, New
Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 92–110.
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II.
I’ll focus initially on the broad claim that impartialist ethics – to use a
label often used by critics who favor a (usually neo-Aristotelian) virtue
ethics approach – cannot leave room for love and friendship.12 My hope is
to gain a better understanding of the objections (concentrating on them
as objections to Kantian ethics) and to determine whether there is a real
disagreement between impartialists and their critics, or whether the critics
are simply confused or mistaken about Kantian ethics and its implications
for love and friendship. I’ll also try to defend Kantian ethics against the
objections.
Let’s begin by looking at the following version of the criticism:
Impartialist ethics does not allow us to take the fact that someone is my
good friend, or my child, or my sibling as a reason for doing something
for that person that I would not generally do for most others. With
respect to Kantian ethics, the claim is quite clearly false. (Whether it is
false as a criticism of consequentialism is a question that I will not take up
here, though I will offer a few remarks on consequentialism in Section
IV.) It is perfectly legitimate, on a Kantian view, for me to buy a present
for my child that I would not buy for other children, and for me to take
the fact that it is my child as a reason for doing so. This is evident from
the latitude in Kant’s imperfect duties – duties to promote the obligatory
ends of others’ happiness, and (though of far less relevance to our topic)
12 The claim that Kantian ethics and utilitarianism place too much value on
impartiality encompasses more than this objection. Other objections that come
under this heading are that the emphasis, or value, placed on impartiality is
incompatible with a healthy self-preference or (relatedly) with taking one’s own
projects seriously or (relatedly) with integrity (though it is very hard to see how
this could be a problem for Kantian impartialism) or with resentment (and other
moral emotions that have as their objects wrong done to oneself, or misconduct
towards oneself, by others). On the objection regarding personal projects and
integrity, see the work of Bernard Williams, especially Bernard Williams, 1981a,
“Persons, Character, and Morality”, in: Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–19; and Bernard Williams, 1981b,
“Moral Luck”, in: Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 20–39; on resentment, see William E. Young, 1998,
“Resentment and Impartiality”, in: Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 36,
pp. 103–130.
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one’s own perfection – and in the fact that he recognizes that we have
special duties to particular others.13 Why would anyone think otherwise?
It might be thought that because Kant’s ethics enjoins us to respect
people as rational beings, we are to like and love them simply as rational
beings. Perhaps because everyone is entitled to respect – the stupid along
with the brilliant, those who do not utilize their rational faculties very
well along with those who do – it is thought that everyone is equally
entitled to our affection. Of course that is not Kant’s view. We are not
enjoined to love or like everyone equally, nor to dole out such resources as
material assistance as if we did love everyone equally. The imperfect duty
to promote others’ happiness does not require (or even encourage) that I
promote others’ happiness equally, or that I choose which persons to aid
impartially, without regard to the fact that some of the people I could aid
are close friends or relatives, while others are mere acquaintances, and still
others whom I could aid are strangers to me.14
But there is more to say about the criticism, and we can explore it
more fully while at the same time addressing a closely related objection.
The related objection is that mere subjective preference is not given its
due in Kantian ethics. That I like someone – even if she is not a relative
or a close friend – seems to be a perfectly decent reason for doing
something for her that I would not do for just anyone.
13 The special duties he recognizes are duties to friends; one surmises that if he had
a section in the Tugendlehre on familial relationships, as he does on friendship, he
would recognize special duties to family, as well. (He does speak of duties of
parents towards their children at [MM 6: 281] and limited duties of children to
their parents, but not of duties of siblings, grandchildren, etc.) It is worth bearing
in mind here that, as Allen Wood explains, Kant’s Metaphysik der Sitten “does not
attempt to cover all the ethical duties that we have. This is because Kant confines
the ‘metaphysics’ of morals only to those duties that are generated by applying
the principle of morality to human nature in general. But many of our duties, as
Kant recognizes, arise from the special circumstances of others, or our relations to
them, and especially from the contingent social institutions defining these
relations” (Allen Wood, 2008, “Duties to Oneself, Duties of Respect to Others”,
forthcoming in: Thomas E. Hill Jr. (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Kant’s Ethics,
Oxford: Blackwell).
14 Relevant sections of Kant’s works include MM 6: 388–394 and 450–454. For
discussion, see Marcia Baron/Melissa Seymour, 2008, “Beneficence and Other
Duties of Love in the Metaphysics of Morals”, forthcoming in: Hill, 2008;
Barbara Herman, 2002, “The Scope of Moral Requirement”, in: Philosophy and
Public Affairs, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 227–256; and Thomas E. Hill Jr. , 2002,
Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives, Oxford: Clarendon Press,
chs. 4 and 7.
Marcia Baron252
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet | 212.87.45.97
Heruntergeladen am | 17.10.12 11:22
I’ll speak to both objections at once – the objection that ties of family
and friendship are short-changed, and the objection that mere subjective
preference is not given its due – but generally frame my points in terms of
subjective preference, since the case might seem easier when it is
friendship and family ties that are at stake. There are two questions that
we need to ask. First, is the point about subjective preference correct? I.e. ,
is the fact that I like someone a perfectly decent reason for doing
something for him or her that I would not do for just anyone? And
second, to the extent that it is correct, does it pose a problem for Kantian
ethics?
My response to the first question is that with some qualifications, it is
correct. The first qualification is that it depends on what it is that I am
doing. But when there is a problem – when the fact that I like someone is
not a perfectly decent reason for doing something for her that I would not
do for just anyone – it is not because liking someone is not an adequate
reason for doing something for that person. The problem, rather, is with
a failure to do something I should do for others. The problem can emerge
in either of the following two forms.
First, the problem might reside in my not doing that same thing for
just anyone. It is permissible for me to invite people to dinner at my home
because I like them, and not to invite people over if I do not like them.
To offer desperately needed help only to those I like would, however, be
far more questionable. The explanation here is pretty straightforward:
people, qua people, have a legitimate claim to desperately needed aid, but
not to dinner invitations. If the situation is one where aid is desperately
needed and not hard or risky for me to provide – e.g. , I need only to dial
(in the US) 911 – I should aid no matter how little I like the person. The
situation is different if the aid is more of a burden to provide and less
badly needed (e.g., an acquaintance wants me to baby-sit so that he can
go to a movie) because there it is not morally incumbent on me to aid.
Second, the problem might reside in my doing something for
someone that precludes my doing something (either the same sort of
thing, or something different) for someone to whom I owe a special
obligation. The mere fact that I am fond of someone is not a perfectly
good reason for bequeathing to him my entire estate if my family has
continually provided me with vital support, both emotional and
financial, throughout my life. (Let’s suppose too that some members of
my family are now in considerable financial need, while the friend of
whom I am fond is not.) The problem here is not exactly that subjective
preference is not by itself much of a reason to favor someone, but rather
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that it does not (objectively, and subjectively should not) trump, or even
rise to the same level as, reasons for acting in ways incompatible with
leaving him my entire estate.15
There is an additional qualification (a tacit proviso, in effect) that also
should be mentioned. That it is my friend is a legitimate reason for doing
X for her (even though I would not do X for just anyone) – unless it is
impermissible to do X in the first place. More perspicuously, if an action
is immoral, the fact that I am doing it for my friend does not alter its
moral status. As William Godwin put it, “What magic is there in the
pronoun ‘my’ to overturn the decisions of everlasting truth?”16 The fact
that someone is my good friend, or my child, or my sibling does not
render an immoral action – e.g. , aiding him in the commission of a crime
– legitimate.
I turn now to the other question, the question about Kant’s ethics.
Does anything I have said point up a shortcoming in Kant’s ethics? Is he
unable to accommodate any of the points I have made? Not that I can
see. Aiding others falls, in Kantian ethics, under the heading of an
imperfect duty, and imperfect duties allow a fair amount of latitude.
Although it is hard to say just how much latitude the duty to promote
others’ happiness allows, we can say this: implicit in Kant’s discussion is
an expectation that we use good judgment in deciding whom and how to
aid, yet there is no prohibition on subjective preference entering in in a
situation where no duties to particular others are thereby neglected.17
15 I thank Justin Brown for this point.
16 William Godwin, 1926, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, ed. by Raymond A.
Preston, New York: Knopf, vol. 1, p. 42. Whether Godwin can allow any moral
relevance to the fact that this is my sister, etc. is not clear, as I explain in Marcia
Baron, 1991, “Impartiality and Friendship”, in: Ethics, vol. 101, no. 4, pp. 836–
857. For discussion of Godwin’s infamous example and the morals he draws from
it, see, in addition to Baron, 1991, Brian Barry, 1995, Justice as Impartiality,
Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Susan Mendus, 2002, Impartiality in
Moral and Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
17 Perhaps we should add here: provided that in favoring someone simply because
one likes him more one does not neglect to aid someone who desperately,
urgently needs one’s aid, and whom one can easily and safely aid. E.g., one
should not put arriving on time to see a dear friend (or anyone else, for that
matter) ahead of stopping to phone for emergency assistance for the person lying
unconscious on the sidewalk (with no one else on the scene). I say “Perhaps”
because it is really hard to know exactly what to add. Kant certainly does not
specify any such requirement, but presumably one could not embrace as an end
others’ happiness and yet regard it as not worth the bother to phone for
emergency assistance (or not an adequate reason for being a few minutes late to
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Neither subjective preference nor personal ties license one to ignore the
needs of others altogether18 or to ignore duties of gratitude, but this does
not render impermissible giving preference in other circumstances to
those I like and love.19
In sum, Kantian ethics has no quarrel with the view that the fact that
someone is my good friend, or my child, or simply a person I like is a
legitimate reason for doing something for that person that I would not do
for just anyone, provided that it is understood that neither subjective
preference nor personal ties license me to ignore the needs of others
altogether, neglect urgent, grave needs, or ignore other duties, such as
duties of gratitude.
III.
Partiality – whether due to mere subjective preference or to ties of family
or friendship – is permissible within moral bounds. It is fine to act for the
reason that this person is my friend, my brother, even my favorite
student; but the fact that this person is my friend, etc. , does not render
an immoral action permissible, and that I am helping my friend does not
alter the fact that the needs of others also make a moral claim on me.
Favorite student? Can an impartialist regard as permissible having a
favorite student? I don’t see why not. Sometimes it is supposed that
partiality is permissible except with respect to those to whom one stands
in a certain sort of relationship, e.g. , one’s students. But things don’t
meet a friend). My uncertainty about what to put in the proviso arises from the
fact that at almost any given time we could help some very needy person
somewhere, and do so easily and safely (by, say, contributing money to Oxfam);
yet it seems clear that Kant’s duty of beneficence does not require that we do so at
every such opportunity. For a searching discussion of Kant on beneficence, see
Herman, 2002.
18 This seems to be the point of MM 6: 390. As I explain in Baron, 1995, Ch. 3,
Kant’s point seems to be that we may not altogether reject an end of (for
example) helping needy strangers on the ground that we are taking care of elderly
parents; but we may limit our pursuit of the first end in favor of the second,
putting much more energy into the latter and relatively little into the former.
However, there is room for debate about just how to read this passage. See Baron/
Seymour, 2008.
19 If Kant’s ethics is to be criticized here, it would make more sense to criticize it for
allowing subjective preference so much play, than for allowing it too little. There
is certainly scope for objections to the effect that we should in fact be required to
attend especially to greatest need.
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divide up in this way. Depending on the behavior in question, it is
permissible to behave towards my students in a way that reflects
differential “liking” for them, inviting only those I like to dinner at my
home, for example; yet it is not okay for the grades I give to express
differential liking, nor would it be permissible for me to agree to write
letters of recommendation only for those I like, rather than for all those I
think are good enough as students to merit a recommendation. (Of
course some professional responsibilities are such that one has to be very
careful indeed not to show partiality. Psychiatrists and clinical psychol-
ogists need to take care not to show partiality towards certain patients,
but then they are also barred from forming friendships with their clients,
something not barred to professors and their students.) Nor, more
importantly, is it the case that outside of professional contexts, partiality is
never a moral issue.20 My fondness for my friend will properly express
itself in all sorts of things that I do for her but do not do for others, but it
must recognize moral limits. The limits are simply the moral limits on all
conduct. If it is immoral to cheat on a test, and to help someone to cheat
on a test, the fact that I am helping my friend cheat and helping him out
of affection for him does not justify my action. It shows me to have some
admirable character traits (along with some not so admirable ones), but
neither my affection for my friend nor our friendship renders permissible
my act of helping him to cheat.
This might conceivably be a point on which partialists take issue with
impartialism. I doubt it, but I might be wrong. Susan Wolf remarks that
the thought that there is nothing wrong with someone who violates
impartial morality to protect her son or daughter is “perhaps the strongest
motivating thought behind partialist morality”. Her example is of a
woman whose son has committed a crime and who chooses to hide him
from the police, even though she knows that unless he is caught, an
innocent person will be wrongly convicted and imprisoned for the
20 I emphasize this because it is often supposed that impartiality is needed only in
special contexts, e.g., when one is grading papers, sitting on a jury, or otherwise
in the seat of a “judge,” or more generally, that it is needed in what might be
thought of as “public” contexts but not in “private” ones. Even apart from the
problems with a public/private distinction, this view is misguided. We need to be
sensitive to considerations that call for a perspective of impartiality rather than
assume they are morally irrelevant except in certain spheres of activity and that
apart from that, there is no need to take up an impartial perspective (or worse,
that it is usually inappropriate to do so). See Baron, 1991.
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crime.21 It seems to me, however, that very few partialists would think it
morally justifiable for the mother to hide him from the police, but they
might claim that though the action was wrong, there is much in it, or
behind it, that is admirable. If this is their view, they are not in
disagreement with Kantians (and other impartialists). The Kantian could
make the same claim – though Kantians are probably slower to find
something admirable in an immoral action committed out of love than
are their partialist critics.
It is more likely that any partialists who find the position
objectionable – the position that the fact that the person is my child or
my very good friend does not render an immoral action morally
permissible – do so because they misunderstand it. It is easily confused
with the position that the fact that someone is my good friend or my
child could never be relevant to the question of whether something is
morally permissible. But they are different, and the first position does not
entail the second. It might well be the case that paternalism of certain
sorts is permissible for me with respect to my child but not with respect
to anyone else (including other children). It might well be the case that
pouring out my woes is permissible vis--vis certain people who are very
close to me, but would be an imposition on others. And it is plausible to
claim that it would be wrong of me never to throw a birthday party for
my child, but not wrong of me never to throw a birthday party for any
other child.22 Almost all impartialists would agree with these claims, and
thus would agree that the fact that it is my friend or child can be relevant
to whether something is permissible.23
21 Susan Wolf, 1992, “Morality and Partiality”, in: Philosophical Perspectives, 6,
Ethics, pp. 243–259, at pp. 253–254. She suggests that it might well be
reasonable for the woman to hide him and that some might infer from this –
though she does not – that it must be moral, too. Wolf ’s view is that it is not
moral, and that the conflict here is between morality and the demands of love
rather than between competing moral concerns.
22 This of course depends on the circumstances of my life; if I live with a friend and
her child, and the friend has to be away on business at the time of the child’s
birthday, refusing to throw a birthday party for the child because it isn’t my child
would be highly dubious. But the point is clear enough: the wrongness of not
throwing a party has to do with the nature of the relationship between the child
and me. I thank Wade Robeson for pressing me on this point.
23 Critics of impartialism sometimes write as if it is part of impartialism to disagree
with these claims (and to hold that the fact that it is my friend or child can have
no bearing on the permissibility of my action). The only authors I am aware of
who come close to fitting their picture of impartialists are William Godwin and
Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the “One Thought Too Many” Objection 257
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet | 212.87.45.97
Heruntergeladen am | 17.10.12 11:22
Of course it will often take sensitivity and finely-tuned judgment to
determine whether the special relation one bears to the person is of a sort
to warrant acting as one proposes. It is not as if the mere fact that this is
my child justifies a particular paternalistic action that I am thinking of
taking; the particulars about the child, and not the mere fact that he is my
child, matter, as do the particulars of our relationship. Knowing to which
friends it is fine (and perhaps even important to the relationship) to pour
out my innermost doubts and fears likewise requires sensitivity and
perceptiveness.24
This need for sensitivity and finely-tuned judgment might seem to
pose a problem for Kantians. Some critics hold that it is part of Kantian
impartialism that principles, and the commitment to adhering to them,
are supposed to supply all of the motivation and understanding that the
agent needs. Arguing that compassion and other “care virtues cannot be
captured within the framework of … impartialist morality,” Larry Blum
claims that according to impartialism, there is no need for agents “to draw
on moral capacities beyond the mere ability to consult the principle.”25
This may be true of the impartialism of Lawrence Kohlberg (the focus of
Blum’s discussion), but it is not characteristic of Kantian impartialism in
moral philosophy. And Kant himself held that the moral law requires
“judgment sharpened by experience” for its application [G 4: 389] and
shows in many passages in the Tugendlehre that sensitivity is crucial for
moral conduct. For example, in discussing beneficence, he writes:
Someone who is rich (has abundant means for the happiness of others, i.e.,
means in excess of his own needs) should hardly even regard beneficence as a
meritorious duty on his part, even though he also puts others under
obligation by it… He must also carefully avoid any appearance of intending
to bind the other by it; for if he showed that he wanted to put the other
under an obligation (which always humbles the other in his own eyes), it
would not be a true benefit that he rendered him [MM 6: 453].
Peter Singer. (I think it no accident that the only people who even come close to
taking this view are consequentialists.) See notes 16 above and 36 below.
24 The idea here is (a) if an action really is immoral, the fact that it is being done for
a loved one does not make it permissible ; but at the same time (b) there are
actions whose permissibility or impermissibility depends on the relationship the
agent bears to the recipient. These usually are actions done for the benefit of the
recipient or for the relationship itself (or perhaps for the agent) and are actions
that (unlike cheating, or violating someone’s confidence) have no significant
negative bearing on others.
25 Lawrence Blum, 1994, Moral Perception and Particularity, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, p. 203.
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That it is a duty (albeit indirect) to “cultivate the compassionate natural
(aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to
sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them”
[MM 6: 457] is further evidence that sensitivity is crucial, in Kant’s view,
for moral conduct. It should also be borne in mind that there are,
according to Kant, “certain moral endowments” that “lie at the basis of
morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty,”
viz. “moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and respect for oneself
(self-esteem)” ([MM 6: 399], italics Kant’s).26
In sum, the fact that sensitivity and judgment will often be needed to
determine whether the special relation one bears to the person warrants
acting as one is thinking of acting is not a problem for Kantian
impartialism, for Kantian ethics does not hold that such capacities are
unnecessary.
IV.
It seems so far that there is very little in Kantian impartialism for
partialists to disagree with. So what is the basis for their charge of
excessive impartialism? One possibility is that the main, or most serious,
objections that partialists have and that they speak of as applying to
impartialist ethics in general actually apply only to consequentialism. I
bring this up because it seems to me that the strongest argument that
claims that impartialist ethics does not leave room for love and (deep)
friendship is one that does not apply to Kantian ethics and has greater
plausibility as a criticism of consequentialism.
Here is how the criticism goes if it is a criticism of consequentialism.
Consequentialism requires us to maximize some impersonal value. (I am
here ignoring satisficing consequentialism, and will throughout my
paper.) But this requires putting impersonal value ahead of our friends
and loved ones, even if it is just a slight increase of impersonal value that
can be realized by, say, taking on a major project aimed at alleviating
homelessness or world hunger, a project that requires that we spend far
26 For further discussion, see Baron, 1995, Ch. 6; Lara Denis, 2000, “Kant’s Cold
Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy”, in: Kantian Review, vol. 4, pp. 48–73; Paul
Guyer, 1993, Kant and the Experience of Freedom, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ch. 10; Nancy Sherman, 1997, Making a Necessity of Virtue:
Aristotle and Kant on Virtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ch. 4; and
Wood, 1999.
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less time with our young children than we otherwise would. Con-
sequentialists retort that consequentialism does not require that we base
our decisions on a calculation of what will maximize impersonal good.
Making decisions on that basis is likely to reduce, on the whole, how
much impersonal good is produced. More good is produced if in fact we
do not focus on maximizing impersonal value and instead rely on
common-sense moral “rules.” They may even claim that it is best that we
never assess our options by asking what will maximize utility, or some
other impersonal value, and indeed that it is best if we never hear of
consequentialism at all.
This may seem to be a viable solution, but let’s take a closer look. The
consequentialist has two options. The first is to say that consequentialism
is intended only as an analysis of what rightness consists in and perhaps as
a tool for determining retrospectively whether what we or someone else
did was right (though once it is introduced as a useful tool, it seems likely
that people would want to use it prospectively as well; so probably
introducing it as a tool of any sort would be too risky). But if
consequentialism has no implications for how to lead our lives, it is not a
very helpful theory. At best it would be useful only for an elite, who
would have the authority to decide what “moral rules” to try to
manipulate (almost) everyone into accepting as “commonsense” (and to
decide which moral rules that they now accept they ought to be
persuaded to discard). This would of course work only if social and
political arrangements were such as to invest in some people the power to
so manipulate the populace. It would not work in a society in which the
free exchange of ideas was encouraged. For it to work, moral philosophy
would be “classified” research, not a subject to be offered to students; or
at the very least, consequentialism would itself have to be entirely off the
table, rather as communism is in the United States. Public policy debates
would have to be fully concealed from the public.
The other option – an option that is necessary if consequentialists
want their theory to provide guidance on how to live, and not through
having a secret elite, invested with power to manipulate our moral views –
is to acknowledge that there have to be some points at which we assess
what we are doing and make adjustments so as to maximize impersonal
good. But then we are back (almost) where we started, for doing this
involves putting impersonal good ahead of loved ones, even if it is just a
slight increase of impersonal value that can be realized by neglecting
loved ones; and it is in this sense that consequentialism is incompatible
with love and friendship.
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I do not mean to endorse this as a knock-down argument, but I think
it is serious as a criticism of consequentialism. (Peter Railton goes quite
far in addressing the objection, however, in his “Alienation, Consequen-
tialism, and the Demands of Morality”).27 By contrast, as a criticism of
Kantian ethics it makes no sense at all, since Kantian ethics has no
requirement that we maximize impersonal value (or, for that matter, any
value). Kantian ethics is far less concerned with bringing about certain
results than is consequentialism, and to the extent that it is concerned
about it – we are, after all, obligated to promote others’ happiness – there
is no requirement that we do as much as we possibly can to bring about
such results. We have a duty to promote others’ happiness (and to perfect
ourselves), but just how we go about this is to a considerable extent up to
us. There is no requirement that we maximize others’ happiness (or the
general happiness, or respect for persons, or any other good). A Kantian’s
positive duties thus appear less likely to dominate her life in a way that
precludes or undermines meaningful relationships than do a consequen-
tialist’s positive duties.
One possibility, then, is that some critics fail to notice that their
argument against impartialism relies on the assumption that impartialism
is concerned to maximize impersonal good, an assumption that is true
only for consequentialist, and not for Kantian, impartialism. Actually, it
is more than just a possibility. In his reply to Railton’s paper, William
Wilcox says that his criticism of Railton applies to my work, as well,
apparently not noticing that his criticism hinges on the theory under
criticism being of a sort that requires maximizing impersonal good.28
Another possibility is that partialist critics may maintain that while
Kantians want to hold that it is permissible to do favors for a loved one
that one would not do for most others – and permissible to do so because
of who she is, and because of one’s love for her – in fact they cannot
consistently take this view. I don’t know of anyone who has argued this,
though some have assumed that there is an inconsistency. The belief that
27 Peter Railton, 1984, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of
Morality”, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 134–171. For
critical discussion, see William Wilcox, 1987, “Egoists, Consequentialists, and
their Friends”, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 73–84; Dean
Cocking/Justin Oakley, 1995, “Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the
Problem of Alienation”, in: Ethics, vol. 106, no. 1, pp. 86–111; and (more
supportively) Alastair Norcross, 1997, “Consequentialism and Commitment”,
in: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol.78, no. 4, pp. 380–403.
28 Wilcox, 1987, pp. 73–74.
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Kantians cannot consistently take this view is fueled, I suspect, by a
confusion concerning the “level” at which an impartial standpoint is
required, on an impartialist picture.29 Whereas impartialists hold that
justification has to take place from an impartial standpoint, critics often
suppose that impartialists believe that one should always take an impartial
standpoint. So, whereas impartialists hold that doing X (say, lavishing
one’s resources on one’s children) is justifiable only if it would be
permissible for anyone similarly situated to do X, it is often claimed that
impartialists hold that the mere fact that it involves favoring certain
people over others, and favoring them simply on grounds of personal
attachment or family ties, suffices to render an action unjustifiable.30
What is involved here is a level confusion. At a meta-level – at the level at
which we reason about what is permitted – we are, on an impartialist
29 In Baron, 1991. See also Cynthia Stark, 1997, “Decision Procedures, Standards
of Rightness, and Impartiality”, in: Nous, vol. 3, pp. 478–495. For misgivings
about a two-level approach, see Susan Mendus, 2002, Impartiality in Moral and
Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 59–64.
30 John Cottingham argues: “When I sit up all night with my sick child, the
impartiality thesis tells me that I am not acting morally; or at least, if my action is
to be justified morally, I have to show that I could not be making a greater
contribution to human welfare by helping any other child who may be in greater
need of care and attention” (John Cottingham, 1983, “Ethics and Impartiality”,
in: Philosophical Studies, vol. 43, pp. 83–99, at p. 88). The impartiality thesis
holds that “to reason ethically, to consider things from the moral point of view, is
to adopt an impartial standpoint.” It is reasonable to suppose that impartialists
hold this thesis (although I should note that I, at least, would count as ethical
reasoning reasoning about what is, say, best for my child, as long as in thinking
about this I recognize and am prepared to abide by moral constraints on what it
is permissible to do for my child). But does it entail what Cottingham says it
entails? Only if it is interpreted in a way that virtually no impartialist would
accept. The unclarity concerns at what level, or with regard to what sorts of
things, one is to adopt the impartial standpoint. Is it with regard to actions one is
thinking of performing? Or is it with regard to the principles which hold some
promise of giving one direction as to what actions to take? In the first instance,
the idea would be that to reason ethically about whatever it is that I am thinking
of doing, I must take care not to allow my decision about what to do to be
influenced by partiality to myself or to others. In the second instance, the idea
would be that we should, in deciding whether it is permissible for us to do X,
detach ourselves as far as possible from our own particular attachments and ask
whether it is permissible for anyone similarly situated to do X. Impartialists hold
the latter, not (usually) the former; but the principle Cottingham adduces has the
implication he alleges only if it is understood to apply as described in the first
instance (as well as in the second instance). For more on this, see Baron, 1991
and Stark, 1997.
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view, to be strictly impartial : the principle that I endorse for others, I
endorse for me and my kin, too. If something is permissible for me, it is
permissible for everyone similarly situated. If it is wrong for children in
circumstances C to do X, then it is wrong for my kid, who is in
circumstances C, to do X. So, impartialists do endorse the irrelevance of
“But it’s my kid we’re talking about!” to the validity of the principle in
question (and to its reach to my child). But that is not to endorse the idea
that “But it’s my kid!” is never morally relevant. Some critics have
wrongly supposed that it is.31 They have not recognized that the position
that in deciding whether a certain principle or policy is permissible, I
should ask whether it is permissible for anyone similarly situated, does not
entail that I should never allow my decision about how to act to be
influenced by partiality to, or my bonds to, certain others. Now if one
thought that my decisions about how to act should always be dictated by
moral principles, there would be little need to distinguish impartiality at
the level of principles from impartiality at the level of deciding what to
do. (There would still be a need to draw such a distinction, though; it
would be between the content of the principle, which could include
particular ties, as in “Honor your parents,” and reasoning about, and
seeking to justify or to challenge, such a principle). But if, as is the case in
Kantian ethics, moral principles typically limit what is permissible
without directing us to take precisely this option and no other, there is
ample room for subjective preference and ties of love and friendship to
influence one’s choices without coming into conflict with morality.
So far I have canvassed some reasons for objecting to “impartialism”
or “impartialist ethics” and have said that at least as applied to Kantian
ethics, the objections are based on a confusion or a misunderstanding.
But I do think there is probably a genuine disagreement to be ferreted
out, so I’ll probe further.
V.
Susan Wolf ’s discussion of impartialism in her essay, “Morality and
Partiality,” provides another point of entry into determining just what the
partialist objections are to impartialism (and in particular to Kantian
impartialism). It is admittedly an odd point of entry, for her character-
ization of impartialism is quite sweeping. Her characterization centers on
31 See for example Cottingham, 1983.
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what she calls the “Impartialist Insight.” The Impartialist Insight is “the
claim that all persons are equally deserving of well-being and respect.”
Impartialism is “the position that a moral person is one who recognizes
and appreciates the Impartialist Insight and integrates it into her life.”32
Although Wolf did not intend this as a slap in the face to partialists –
indeed, she expresses a strong sympathy for their views – the character-
ization might well offend. Partialists might protest that they too recognize
that all persons are equally deserving of well-being and respect, and that
they too hold that a moral person recognizes and appreciates this insight.
Depending on what is meant by “integrating the insight into one’s life,”
aren’t virtually all of us impartialists? I’ll set aside this concern and
consider how her very inclusive characterization can help locate disagree-
ment about the value of impartiality and its place in our lives. Lest this
seem offensive or, if not that, simply bizarre, I should explain that as I see
it, the division between impartialists and partialists, and the labels
“impartialist” and “partialist,” are clumsy, and thus it is not imperative
that a characterization or definition of impartialism accurately capture
that division. Since my concern is to locate, understand and attempt to
reply to the criticisms of Kantian impartialism – criticisms that are at the
heart of the motivation for virtue ethics – rather than to find a
characterization of impartialism that does justice to the labels “imparti-
alists” and “partialists,” Wolf ’s characterization is useful for my purposes.
And while it has the result that some who would usually be called
“partialists” become, on her terminology, “moderate impartialists,” it does
provide for a wide range of views regarding the proper role or place of
impartiality in our lives.
I take it that her characterization of impartialism is not meant to
entail that according to impartialists, it is a sufficient condition of being a
moral person that one recognize and appreciate the Impartialist Insight
and integrate it into one’s life. The idea, presumably, is that it is a
necessary condition. (Any doubts one might have about this are allayed
by her remarks to the effect that morality is “not just about treating
people equally or fairly, but about treating them well.”)33 That being the
case, room for disagreement – and for varieties of impartialism – will
arise in connection with what it means to integrate the Impartialist
Insight into one’s life (and relatedly, just what it is to appreciate the
32 Wolf, 1992, p. 245.
33 Ibid., p. 247.
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Insight). As Wolf says, integrating it into one’s life need not involve
letting it absolutely take over.34
What will it involve? At a minimum, that one holds herself to “the
same standards that she expects of others.” This is the “strict” part of
impartialism. The part that is harder to spell out precisely is this:
integrating the Impartialist Insight into one’s life means that one is
“moved to practical effect by the thought that others – all others – are as
deserving of the fundamental conditions of well-being and respect as are
she and her circle of friends and loved ones.” It will have some practical
effect, as Wolf puts it, “on one’s politics, on one’s activities, on one’s
choice of how to spend one’s money.”35
The place where disagreement initially seems most likely is in the last
bit I quoted – in how much and what sort of effect one’s appreciation of
the Impartialist Insight will have on one’s politics, one’s activities, one’s
choice of how to spend one’s money. But I am not sure that such
disagreements will have much to do with disagreements about the value
of impartiality and the value of bonds of love and friendship. They will
have more to do with views about property rights, economic distribution,
etc. , views which could, but needn’t, be tied to views about the value of
impartiality and the value of family bonds. I am not aware that
impartialists more typically hold that one should give a large percentage
of one’s income to charity or to social programs designed to reduce social
and economic inequalities than do partialists. It is true that impartialists
may have a harder time justifying gross economic disparities, but there
are many different views as to the best ways – and the prospects for –
altering the disparities, and it does not seem that partialists and
impartialists line up on opposing sides. So far then, it does not look as if
disagreements regarding the practical effect that an appreciation of the
Impartialist Insight will have on one’s life will be such as to split partialists
and impartialists into two camps, or even into several groups that could
be plotted along a scale where extreme impartialism is at one end, and
extreme partialism is at the other.
But there is another way in which Wolf ’s characterization of
impartialism yields a source of disagreement. The disagreement concerns
how one is to integrate the Impartialist Insight into one’s life but does not
mainly concern the practical effect of the Insight on one’s politics and on
how one chooses to spend one’s money. It has more to do with how it is
34 Ibid., p. 245.
35 Ibid., p. 246.
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that we are to integrate the Impartialist Insight into our lives without
letting it “absolutely take over.” Specifically, it concerns just how ready we
should be to take up a detached perspective, to view our relations to others just
as someone’s relations to others (and to think of the people we love just as some
persons). It concerns the notion that there can be “one thought too many.”
I can best reflect the sorts of disagreements I have in mind by noting
some disagreements among those who write on the subject. First, consider
Wolf ’s rejection of some forms of impartialism. In characterizing
impartialism as she does, Wolf makes a point of avoiding what she
calls “Extreme Impartialism.” One form of Extreme Impartialism is
something that virtually all impartialists would reject: on this view, “a
person is morally required to take each person’s well-being, or
alternatively each person’s rights, as seriously as every other, to work
equally hard to secure them, or to care equally much about them, or to
grant them equal value in her practical deliberations.”36 That the view is
absurd is evident from the fact that it entails, as she puts it, that “morality
requires one to care, or to act as if one cares, no more about one’s own
child than about a stranger’s.” So far I am in complete agreement with
Wolf. But she deems “only slightly less absurd” the “much more popular
view … that permits partisan emotions and behavior, as long as in fact
they promote nonpartisan goals.”37 Apart from the fact that her wording
makes the connection between “partisan emotions and behavior” and
“nonpartisan goals” sound rather loose, this view is the standard
consequentialist reply to partialist criticisms. It is, I take it, Railton’s
position. (In fact as stated it is weaker than the standard consequentialist
reply because it says nothing about maximizing: it does not require that
the partisan emotions and behavior maximally promote nonpartisan
goals. But her subsequent comment on it does mention maximizing).
Why does Wolf think it extreme, and rather absurd? She explains:
“The acceptability of coaching one’s daughter’s soccer team, or taking
one’s friend to dinner on her birthday does not rest on the fortuitous
coincidence that this action, or even the way of life that gives rise to it, is
36 Ibid., p. 244. One impartialist who appears to accept this thesis is Peter Singer.
He tries to argue from the position that ethical judgments should be made from a
universal point of view to the conclusion that ethical conduct requires agents to
weigh up the interests of “all those affected” by one’s decision and “adopt the
course of action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected” (Peter
Singer, 1979, Practical Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10–
12).
37 Ibid., p. 244.
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the one that will maximize human welfare or equal respect all around.”
Not, I agree, on the fortuitous coincidence, but if we replace “fortuitous
coincidence” with “fact” is the view that she rejects absurd? Not being a
consequentialist, I do not endorse the view; but it does not seem to me to
be an “extreme” form of impartialism, or in any way absurd.38 I suspect
that to those who find it absurd, the problem is that it runs afoul of the
“one thought too many” requirement, a requirement that I find elusive,
but which seems to involve the notion that justification either should not
be sought, or should not be sought from a distant, objective point of
view. More on that shortly.
VI.
The first disagreement was Wolf ’s disagreement with a view that is
associated with Railton. The second is a disagreement I have with
Railton. Whereas Wolf finds extreme impartialism in the view he
develops, I find no such thing; by contrast, I find him to be too hard on
impartialism (and in that sense, insufficiently impartialist). Railton’s
article begins with two examples that are designed to show the need to
explain how impartial morality and friendship are compatible. For the
sake of brevity, I’ll discuss just one of them, but since the details matter, I
need to quote it in full.
To many, John has always seemed a model husband. He almost invariably
shows great sensitivity to his wife’s needs, and he willingly goes out of his
38 An alternative is suggested by Cottingham (John Cottingham, 1997–1998, “The
Ethical Credentials of Partiality”, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol.
XCVIII, pp. 1–21). Cottingham emphasizes that “goodness grows from the
inside outwards,” i.e. , that “human lives are valuable not primarily in virtue of
how far they conform to impersonally defined rules of conduct, or in so far as
they contribute to some giant amalgam called ‘the good’, but in so far as they are
lived in ways which give richness and meaning to the short journey each of us has
to undergo” (pp. 7–8). And thus one might argue that it is absurd to think that
the acceptability of coaching one’s daughter’s soccer team and the like rests on the
fact that this action or the way of life that gives rise to it will maximize human
welfare for, the argument might go, they rest on the meaning they give to the
agent and those close to her. But this is implausible; for even if we grant
Cottingham’s point about the source of value, the question of permissibility or
acceptability still remains, and it hardly seems absurd to think that the
permissibility rests on facts about how this action fits or fails to fit with
something beyond it, e.g. , whether it or the way of life that gives rise to it
maximizes human welfare.
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way to meet them. He plainly feels great affection for her. When a friend
remarks upon the extraordinary quality of John’s concern for his wife, John
responds without any self-indulgence or self-congratulation. “I’ve always
thought that people should help each other when they’re in a specially good
position to do so. I know Anne better than anyone else does, so I know better
what she wants and needs. Besides, I have such affection for her that it’s no
great burden – instead, I get a lot of satisfaction out of it. Just think how
awful marriage would be, or life itself, if people didn’t take special care of the
ones they love.” His friend accuses John of being unduly modest, but John’s
manner convinces him that he is telling the truth: this is really how he feels.39
John’s reply is supposed to be jarring, unsettling. It may be unwise of me
to admit this in print, but I don’t find it jarring. Not that it strikes me as
entirely devoid of oddness. The one thing that I find odd in his reply is
something that was pointed out by one of my students, who remarked
that she kept waiting to learn that Anne was a paraplegic. John’s tone
regarding his wife seems peculiarly solicitous. But I don’t think that has
anything to do with what Railton expects us to find disturbing.
What might be thought a more appropriate reply to his friend? John
could simply say that he loves Anne, but this would not speak to his
friend’s suggestion that there is something remarkable about the quality
of John’s concern. Presumably lots of husbands love their wives. And it
would be presumptuous of John to suggest that he loves his wife more
than most husbands love their wives, or that Anne is exceptionally
lovable, and that that is why he does more than most husbands do for
their wives. Alternatively, John could claim that he does not think that he
is unusual, but that if he is, that suggests that something is amiss with
other husbands. That reply, I suppose, would be just as “impersonal” as
the one that he does offer.
I don’t see John’s reply to be disturbingly impersonal, and, apart from
the solicitude that I noted, I don’t see it as in any way peculiar. Why does
Railton think that it is? He invites us to reflect on how John’s remarks
might sound to Anne.
Anne might have hoped that it was, in some ultimate sense, in part for her
sake and the sake of their love as such that John pays such special attention to
her… It is as if John viewed her, their relationship, and even his own
affection for her from a distant, objective point of view – a moral point of
view where reasons must be reasons for any rational agent and so must have
an impersonal character even when they deal with personal matters. His wife
might think a more personal point of view would also be appropriate, a
39 Railton, 1984, p. 135.
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point of view from which “It’s my wife” or “It’s Anne” would have direct and
special relevance, and play an unmediated role in his answer to the question
“Why do you attend to her so?”40
An answer to that question, it seems to me, would be likely to take the
form of “I think relationships are best if…” Actually, such questions are
hard to answer, partly because it is not clear just what the person is
wondering. But a reasonable guess would be that John’s friend is not
wondering what particular qualities of Anne’s make her especially lovable,
or anything of that sort, but rather is interested in hearing the sort of
thing that John in fact does say. Later in his essay, Railton draws an
analogous example, of Juan and Linda, and what is interesting is that the
chief difference between Juan and John is that it takes more time, and
some very definite prodding from the questioner, to get Juan to take a
distant, impersonal perspective. This supports my hunch that one
difference in views about impartialism concerns how ready one can be to
take up the distant, impersonal perspective without that readiness
properly raising suspicions. Juan is less ready than John; that, it seems, is
why he, unlike John, does not seem to Railton to be alienated from his
wife or from his affections. So perhaps one disagreement between
partialists and impartialists, and between moderate impartialists and
immoderate or extreme impartialists concerns how readily one should be
able to shift from a personal to an impersonal perspective.
There is a complication that I omitted. Discussing John, Railton says,
“That he devotes himself to her because of the characteristically good
consequences of doing so seems to leave her, and their relationship as
such, too far out of the picture…”41 Now, if John does devote himself to
her because of these consequences, then I agree with Railton (though I
didn’t read John’s reply to his friend in this way). But Railton also says, as
quoted earlier, that the answer that Anne might hope for, and which he
thinks is in order, is one in which “It’s my wife” or “It’s Anne” would play
an unmediated role. And the suggestion thus seems to be that the thought
that marriages are better, and indeed that the world is a better place,
thanks to such devotion, is one thought too many.42
40 Ibid., p. 136.
41 Ibid., p. 136.
42 Related to this position is the claim that actions done from love or friendship
should not be “mediated” (or rather, the love itself should not be mediated) by a
commitment to doing what is right, being a virtuous person, or anything else of
that ilk. Here again the idea seems to be that one thought too many is involved –
Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the “One Thought Too Many” Objection 269
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet | 212.87.45.97
Heruntergeladen am | 17.10.12 11:22
Now, to connect this up with the question of why impartialism is
found objectionable: It seems to me that the deepest disagreement that
partialist critics have with impartialism (once misunderstandings are
cleared away), and that some moderate impartialists have with what they
might, following Wolf, regard as “extreme impartialism,” concerns when,
and how readily, it is decent or even good to take up a detached
perspective, and when doing so involves having “one thought too many.”
That being the case, it is now time to try to figure out what it means to
have one thought too many, in the way developed by Bernard Williams
and endorsed by (among others) Julia Annas and Susan Wolf and to some
extent by Peter Railton.43 (Given my leanings towards rather extreme
impartialism, I am not in the best position to appreciate the possibility of
one thought too many. Hopefully this essay will prompt some who are in
a better position to explain it.)
VII.
I do understand that there are thoughts such that the fact that one has
them calls the person’s character into question – thoughts, for example,
about what forms of torture one would most enjoy inflicting, should one
even, it seems, if the person is not thinking about rightness or virtue while acting
lovingly. I discuss this below, and at length in Baron, 1995, ch. 4.
43 The locus classicus of “one thought too many” is Williams, 1981a. In mentioning
Julia Annas, I have in mind Julia Annas, 1984, “Personal Love and Kantian
Ethics in Effi Briest”, in Philosophy and Literature, vol. 8, pp. 15–31. I reply to
her article in Marcia Baron, 1988, “Was Effi Briest a Victim of Kantian
Morality?”, in: Philosophy and Literature, vol. 12, pp. 95–113. Wolf invokes the
notion of “one thought too many” in Susan Wolf, 1982, “Moral Saints”, in:
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79, no. 8, pp. 419–439, as does Jean Rumsey in Jean
Rumsey, 1997, “Re-visions of Agency in Kant’s Moral Theory”, in: Robin May
Schott (ed.), Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant, University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press; Harry Frankfurt also endorses it, though
he takes issue with Williams’ way of putting the point (Harry Frankfurt, 2004,
The Reasons of Love, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 36–37). For
(generally critical) discussions, see Baron, 1995, ch. 4; Guyer, 1993, ch. 10;
Herman, 1993, ch. 2; Thomas Nagel, 1982, “Williams: One Thought Too
Many”, in: The Times Literary Supplement, May 6, reprinted in: Thomas Nagel,
1995, Other Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 167–173; Madison
Powers, 1993, “Contractualist Impartiality and Personal Commitments”, in:
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 30, pp. 63–71; Samuel Scheffler, 1992,
Human Morality, Oxford: Oxford University Press; and David Velleman, 1999,
“Love as a Moral Emotion”, in: Ethics, vol. 109, pp. 338–374.
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find oneself in a position where torturing others was part of one’s job
description.44 Likewise, if upon reading Bernard Williams’ example of
Pedro and Jim, one’s thought was “I’d never ordinarily choose to kill an
innocent person, but if I were in Jim’s situation, not only would I not
hesitate, I would savor the richness of the experience.”45 But even if, as
seems unlikely, one or both of these thoughts should be classified as one
thought too many – as opposed to something like one horrendous thought –
they do not seem to be a helpful model for understanding how it is that
the thought that what one is doing is morally right is one thought too
many.
I also appreciate that there are times when some thoughts, though
innocuous enough in themselves, are inappropriate, and cause for some
consternation. I remember a film, “Ordinary People,” in which the
protagonist recalls that as he and his wife dressed to go to the funeral of
their child, she suggested that he wear a different pair of shoes (and not
for reasons of comfort). That she was thinking at that time about which
shoes he should wear troubled him, and possibly it is in roughly this way
that some find attention to moral matters at a time such as when one’s
spouse is in grave danger of drowning, disturbing. But the point about
one-thought-too-many seems to go beyond this. And it seems to take two
rather different directions. The more radical direction is that justification
is unnecessary or that justification should not be sought from an
impersonal, impartial perspective; this I take to be Williams’s suggestion.
(In reference to the example of someone in a position to save one but not
both people in an accident, and who chooses to save his wife, Williams
says that the “random” element in such events…should be seen…as…a
reminder that some situations lie beyond justifications.”)46 The other,
more moderate direction is the one that I see in Railton’s discussion:
Railton is not at all opposed to seeking such justification but has doubts
about agents who are quick to think about their deepest attachments
from an impartial perspective. A readiness to detach and view things
objectively is, it seems, alienating, or expressive of alienation, alienation
44 I discuss this in Marcia Baron, 2002b, “Character, Immorality, and Punishment”,
in: Walter Sinnott Armstrong/Robert Audi (eds.), Rationality, Rules, and Ideals :
Essays on Bernard Gert’s Moral Theory, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
pp. 243–258.
45 See Bernard Williams, 1973, “A Critique of Utilitarianism”, in: J. J. Smart/
Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge
University.
46 Williams, 1981a, p. 18.
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both from others and from one’s own affective nature. At least this seems
to be the idea. The more moderate direction, taken by Railton, may just
be that there are times when such detachment is inappropriate; but I
expect, given his examples, that there is more to it than this.
For other (arguably more extreme) misgivings about one-thought-
too-many, I turn to a discussion by Julia Annas, “Personal Love and
Kantian Ethics in Effi Briest,” in which she argues that whether or not it
was his intention, Theodor Fontane’s novel, Effi Briest, shows the
disastrous effects of a Kantian moral outlook.47 The relevant part of the
story is as follows. When Effi’s husband learns that six years earlier she
had an adulterous affair, he divorces her (and, challenging the former
lover to a duel, kills him), and Effi’s parents announce that they will have
nothing to do with her. Subsequently their family physician, concerned
about Effi’s failing health and general misery, urges her parents to drop
their stance towards her and invite her to live with them. Her mother is
initially reluctant and says to her husband, “I love her as much as you do,
perhaps more. But we’ve not been sent into the world just to be weak and
forebearing and show respect for all that’s against the laws of God and
man.” He replies: “Oh really, Luise. One thing’s more important…Par-
ents’ love for their children.”48
What Effi’s father says seems to me straightforward: he is saying that
parents’ love for their children (and expressing that love) are more
important than showing respect for prohibitions on adultery by refusing
to have anything to do with anyone who ever committed adultery. He is
speaking from an impartial point of view – and, I would add, doing so
quite appropriately. Annas rejects this reading (or something very like
it).49 She writes: “He does not mean that parents are morally permitted to
love their children, which could hardly have much weight against their
moral condemnation of Effi’s actions, and anyway would be a classic case
of what Williams aptly calls having ‘one thought too many,’ weakening
47 See Annas, 1984.
48 Theodor Fontane, 1967, Effi Briest, trans. by Douglas Parmee, London: Penguin
Books, p. 251.
49 I say “or something very like it” because the view she rejects is one in which he is
saying, among other things, that parents are morally permitted to love their
children, whereas I take him more literally to be saying that parental love is what
is most important in a case like this. (See below.)
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the force of a natural attachment by giving it a roundabout and
unconvincing justification from the impartial point of view.”50
I find Annas’ statement puzzling for a number of reasons. First, the
idea would not be exactly that parents are permitted to love their
children, but just what he says: parents’ love for their children is more
important [more important than (public) condemnation of immorality].
Permissibility enters in, but not in the way she suggests : it comes in
because the implication is that because parental love is more important, it
is okay to permit one’s love for one’s children to carry the day in a
situation such as this. Annas says that this could not have much weight
against their moral condemnation of Effi’s actions. Why not? It seems
clear that it would. Probably she says this because she was thinking of the
mere fact that parents are permitted to love their children, not what Effi’s
father says, namely, that parental love is more important.
Second, why is there one thought too many? It is not as if he brought
up the question of moral permissibility, an issue which, I would agree, it
seems unnecessary to bring up, since we can hardly imagine that it would
be wrong to welcome their daughter back (though we can well imagine
that it would violate some community mores). Had he brought up the
question of moral permissibility, I would agree that it is one thought too
many; not, however, because one should not think about morality when
one’s son’s or daughter’s welfare is at stake, but simply because it should
be obvious (at least to us, in our era) that what Effi’s father proposes to do
is not immoral. But in fact he is not raising the issue of moral
permissibility. He is replying to his wife’s worry that what they are doing
is wrong, and is claiming that it is not wrong. It is hard to see how his
thought could be one thought too many.
The third thing that I find puzzling about Annas’ remark is this: how
would this thought – the thought that dropping their moral condem-
nation and welcoming her back is not wrong – weaken the force of a
natural attachment? I’ll address this in a moment, but first I should
acknowledge that there is another possible reading of Effi’s father’s
remark.
50 Annas, 1984, p. 28. The details of her interpretation of Effi’s father’s remark are
not important here, since I am citing her discussion only to have a better
understanding of what counts as one thought too many, and what makes it “too
many.” But for those who are curious, here is her understanding of Effi’s father’s
remark: “he realizes belatedly that it cannot be right to see morality as
assimilating deep love and commitment to pathological weakness and self-
indulgence” (p. 28).
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I construed his remark to be that because parental love matters more,
taking Effi back is not wrong. But it might be claimed that he is not
speaking from a moral point of view but is rejecting it (and I do mean it,
not merely rejecting the point of view of conventional morality).
“Morality be damned! Parental love matters more.” I don’t think this is
what he means, but I don’t want to press that. I am interested in how
things would be different if this were what he meant. Would there no
longer be one thought too many? Perhaps, but that is not entirely clear.
He would be rejecting the idea that moral justification is appropriate
here; so if the one thought too many is the thought that what is being
proposed is morally justified, that thought is absent. Notice, however,
that he is saying that parental love matters more, not simply that it
matters more to him, but that it matters more – presumably from an
impartial perspective. If taking up that perspective involves one thought
too many, then the reinterpretation of what he is saying would not take
care of the problem. There would still be one thought too many. The
thought would change, but its status as “one thought too many” would
not.
The other question I want to ask is this: Would we think better of
Effi’s father if his remark were, or meant, “Morality be damned! Parental
love matters more!”? Is it better to say that morality does not matter here
– does not matter as much as parental love, anyway – than to say that
morality endorses what they are doing? I don’t think so. To take that view
would seem (by conversational implicature) to endorse the notion that it
actually is morally wrong of them to drop their moral condemnation of
Effi for the adulterous affair that she had many years earlier. It seems
much more apt to deny that it is morally wrong to do so, and to affirm
that it is right to welcome her back into the family, and into their home.
Now, back to the question of why the alleged one thought too many
– the thought that what they are about to do is morally right – would
weaken the force of a natural attachment. (I am referring to Annas’s claim
that this “would be a classic case of…having ‘one thought too many,’
weakening the force of a natural attachment by giving it a roundabout
and unconvincing justification from the impartial point of view.”) If the
thought is to have any effect on their love for Effi, it would most likely be
to strengthen it, for they now will realize that they need not feel guilty or
otherwise uncomfortable about welcoming their daughter – a “fallen
woman” – back into the family. And they can quit fretting about what
people will think; they know that what they are doing is right. So, why is
the thought supposed to interfere, and weaken their love? Maybe it is felt
Marcia Baron274
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet | 212.87.45.97
Heruntergeladen am | 17.10.12 11:22
that what will dominate their thoughts and feelings is a sense of moral
rectitude rather than love for their daughter. Maybe the worry is that
they’ll welcome her back because it is right, rather than because they love
her. I don’t see any reason why the thought that what they are doing is
right would be likely to take over in this way. They welcome her back
because they love her, and in the knowledge that what they are doing is
right. Perhaps some would say that their love is mediated, and should be
unmediated; the thought is one too many because it would be better,
critics will say, if their love were not so qualified. It would be better if
they could act from love without caring about, or paying any attention to,
whether what they are doing is morally right.
There is some truth to the last point – but only because it seems to us
so obvious that they were doing what is morally right that attention to the
question of moral rightness seems silly. But it is not the case that in
general, love should be unmediated by moral considerations. We are
grateful that David Kaczynski did not think that love for his brother, or
his relationship with his brother, was more important than going to the
FBI with evidence that his brother was the Unabomber. We are glad that
his love was not “unmediated.” And this is not a case where we are simply
glad because of the results. We admire him for his courage, and we do not
judge him cold and unloving.51 Of course it might be replied that
happily, most of us do not have the Unabomber or any other mass
murderer as a close relative, and therefore our love can and should be
unmediated. I disagree, not because you never know for sure – your
brother or sister may be a murderer too – but because these particularly
dramatic moral considerations are not the only ones that merit our
attention, and that our love for someone may tempt us to overlook. We
need to be ready to assess the moral claim that the competing
51 In fact his love for his brother (evident in the lecture he gave at Indiana
University, Nov. 11, 2005) is quite dazzling. He did everything he could to
provide his brother with first-rate legal counsel and sought repeatedly to visit
him, despite Ted’s unwavering refusals ; in fact he continues to write to him
regularly, reiterating his love for him, despite Ted’s refusal to have any contact
with his family. David Kaczynski is evidence that one’s love for another need not
be unmediated for one to be committed to standing by the person – in some way
– come what may. There are different ways of standing by someone, and some are
fully compatible with recognizing and addressing the grave wrongs (and in this
instance, crimes) that the other has committed (and may continue to commit if
one does not intervene).
Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the “One Thought Too Many” Objection 275
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet | 212.87.45.97
Heruntergeladen am | 17.10.12 11:22
considerations make on us, and I see no reason to doubt that we can do so
without it weakening or cheapening our love.52
In short, I don’t see how the thought that what one is doing is morally
right or permissible could be one thought too many unless it is so obvious
that what one is doing is morally justified that there is no need to think
about it.
VIII.
To recapitulate: After explaining why I think it more fruitful to assess the
objections of virtue ethicists to Kantian ethics than to consider whether a
Kantian virtue ethics is possible, I turned my attention to the (somewhat
vague) objection that Kantian ethics is excessively impartialist, or
overvalues impartiality. Focusing then on more precise statements of
the objection, I evaluated the claim that Kantians cannot allow me to take
the fact that someone is my good friend, or my child, or my sibling (or
even just someone I like) as a reason for doing something for that person
that I would not generally do for most others. I asked first whether the
claim – the alleged fact – is correct, whatever its applicability as a
criticism of Kant’s ethics. I argued that with two important qualifications,
it is correct. The first qualification is that it depends on what it is that we
are doing. There are things that we ought to do for anyone, not only our
friends and relations, and neither subjective preference nor special ties
license us to ignore the needs of others altogether. The second (and
closely related) qualification is that the fact that it is my friend or relative
is a legitimate reason for doing X for him only if it is not impermissible to
do X in the first place. With these qualifications in place, I claimed that
while this position may be at odds with consequentialism, it is not in
conflict with Kantian ethics.
Nonetheless, there might be something else in Kantian ethics that
critics find unduly “impartialist,” and I tried to ferret it out by utilizing
Susan Wolf ’s novel characterization of impartialism. A disagreement that
52 I should clarify that it is not my claim that the fact that someone is a close friend
or relative should never affect our judgment about how to deal with a particular
(suspected) wrongdoing, and specifically, about whether to turn the person in to
the authorities. Our relationship with someone does count in the moral balance,
particularly when the wrong was (morally) minor – a harmless wrongdoing or
perhaps not even a wrongdoing at all, apart from being a violation of the law –
and all the more so if in addition the person is likely to be punished too harshly.
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critics have, I suggested, concerns how ready we should be to take up a
detached perspective towards those we love or towards our relationships
with them. This is a genuine disagreement, but Kantians have no cause
for embarrassment, or for worry that Kantian agents have one thought
too many.53
53 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a conference on ethics and
impartiality at the University of Utah, at a UK Kant Society conference (Keele,
England), at McGill University (as a colloquium cosponsored by the philosophy
departments of the University of Montreal and McGill University), Auckland
University, Indiana University, and the University of Kentucky. I am grateful to
discussants, and to Wade Robison, who presented a comment at the Utah
conference. I would also like to thank Justin Brown, Sarah Conly, Michael Gorr,
Mark Jenkins, Samuel Kerstein, Henry Richardson, David Suryk, Christine
Swanton, and David Velleman for their helpful comments.
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